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FAR EASTERN SECTION
REVISION OF THE JAPANESE MINING LAW UNDER
THE OCCUPATION*
ALBERT H. SOLOMONtIN LINE with the policy of the Supreme Commander for the Allied
Powers to democratize the mining industry of Japan, a study of
existing mining law was undertaken in 1946 by a National Mining
Law Revision Committee' appointed by the Minister of Commerce
and Industry (now Minister of International Trade and Industry).
After four years of investigation, drafting, and redrafting of a revised
Mining Bill, with technical assistance from a visiting mineral law
expert from the United States2 and from lawyers and agricultural and
forest economists employed in the Japanese government and in the
Headquarters of SCAP, as well as public hearings throughout Japan,
the Japanese government on December 20, 1950, promulgated the
finished product, a revised Mining Law (Law No. 289, 1950) effective
January 31, 1951.
Behind the remaking of the mining code of this phenomenal country,
which in size is somewhat smaller than the state of California, lies a
story worth telling. It cannot be read in the quaint mixture of kanji,
hiragana, and katanaka characters that run top to bottom and right to
*Reprinted by permission from Weekly Summary No. 286, Natural Resources Sec-
tion, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.
tMember of the Bar of the state of Washington; Deputy Chief, Mining and Geology
Division, Natural Resources Section, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for
the Allied Powers.
'This Committee included Professors Jiro Tanaka, Sakae Wagatsuma, and Sanji
Suenobu, Faculty of Jurisprudence, Tokyo University, Chiefs of the Forestry Agency
and Agricultural Land Bureau, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, and of the Min-
ing Bureau, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, and representatives of the Attorney
General's Office, Japan Mining Ass'n, Coal Ass'n, Forestry Ass'n and Imperial Oil Co.
2 Mr. Royal R. Duncan, retired, formerly of the Solicitor's Office, United States
Department of Interior, visited Japan March 10 to July 16, 1949.
3 The legal assistance force comprised Messrs. Robert H. Neptune, formerly of the
Legal Section, GHQ, SCAP, a member of the Bar of the state of Oklahoma; John L.
Cooper, Agriculture Division, Natural Resources Section, a member of the Minnesota
and Wisconsin state bars; Iwao Iida, member of the Bar of Japan, consultant, Natural
Resources Section; Messrs. Takeo Kobayashi, Chief, Masanori Takeda, Masayukl
Serikawa, Hide Osono, and Masao Beppu, legal advisers, Mining Policy Section, Min-
ing Bureau, Resources Agency, Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry;
and the writer. Notable contributions to the work of revision were made by Messrs.
Frank A. Ineson, forest economist, B. M. Jensen, S. Takahashi, and Miss Dorothy
Goodwin, agricultural economists, Natural Resources Section, and Messrs. Kihachi
Sanuki, Chief, and Susumu Hara, liaison, Mining Policy, Resources Agency, Ministry
of International Trade and Industry.
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left in the Japanese version of the law, nor even in the labored English
translation.
HISToRIcAL BACKGROUND
Although mining dates back more than 1,200 years in Japan, and
scrolls are extant showing native miners laboriously extracting gold
ore by hand pick at the famous Sado Island mine off Niigata some 240
years ago, modem mining had its start with the Meiji Restoration
(1868). The new government, succeeding the weakened Tokugawa
Shogunate, took over the management of all important mines, includ-
ing the Sado gold mine, the Ikuno and Kosaka silver operations, and
the Miike, Takashima, and Poronai coal mines. Large capital invest-
ment was made in the most modem imported machinery and mining
engineers were brought in from Europe and America at high salaries
to improve techniques, in a manner not unlike the flow of technicians
and latest machinery and equipment from the United States to Japan
during the Occupation. But there was this difference: The Meiji
government took this action to meet the demands of the military and
the "preservation of peace" by expansion of the war machine, while
the Occupation is doing it to enable Japan to restore her industrial
economy and become self-sustaining.
The Mining Direction and Pit Laws enacted in 1872-3 (Ordinances
No. 100, March 1872 and No. 259, July 1873, respectively) were
based on the principle of national monopoly of mining and declared
the ownership of the Emperor in all unmined minerals, even though
the lands were owned by private individuals. All mining concessions
were government-owned.
The years 1884-96 saw a drastic turn in events for the mining in-
dustry. The industrialists and moneyed class, which had lent the weight
of their influence to unseat the Shogunate, eventually capitalized on
their support of the restoration. And when the government encoun-
tered one of its frequent financial crises, the first break in government
ownership occurred by disposition of one of its mines to a private
individual-the sale of the Kosaka silver mine to Fujita-gumi in 1884.
Other industrialists also took advantage of the need of the government
for funds to build its military strength for the two tests with China
and Russia which lay ahead: In 1886 Mitsui acquired the rich Iwaon-
obori sulfur mine in Hokkaido and the silver, lead, and copper deposits
at Kamioka; 1888 saw the transfer of the Ani copper and Innai silver
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mines to Furukawa, and the Miike colliery, today Japan's largest coal
producer, also went to Mitsui; Poronai (now Horonai) coal mine,
one of the largest Hokkaido producers from an early date, in 1889
went to a group organized as the Hokkaido Coal Mining Co.; and
the fabulous Sado gold mine and Ikuno copper mine became the
property of the Iwasaki family (Mitsubishi) in 1896."
The Ani silver mine is typical of the chain of title to some of the
older mining operations. According to its present owners, the deposit
was discovered in 1575 and worked spasmodically until 1701, when
Lord Satake, the Daimyo (feudal baron), took possession. In 1868,
under the Meiji Restoration, it became the property of Akita pre-
fectural government by succession from the local ruler. In 1875 the
Japanese imperial government took over under the then recently
enacted Pit Law. In 1880 German engineers were brought in and intro-
duced new mining and metallurgical practices. Later in the 80's the
imperial government sold the mine to Ichibei Furukawa, who operated
it for copper until it was closed by the depression in 1931. In 1934
it was reopened by the Furukawa Ringyobu (Forest Industry Branch)
Co. Ltd. and worked for copper and gold until 1943. It is still owned
and operated by the Furukawa Mining Co., and recent exploration
work has developed excellent prospects for new ore bodies rich in gold
content.
In 1890, shortly after the private acquisition of most of these valu-
able deposits, the Pit Law was revised to protect the new ownership
and established the system of priority of claims, strongly entrenching
private enterprise in mining. The Mining Act (Law No. 87, Septem-
ber 1890, effective June 1892) subsequently replaced the Pit Law
and the Mining Direction Law, reasserting the principle of priority of
mining claims, but definitely excluding government monopoly and
making the government itself subject to the same rights and obligations
as a private person if it undertook to engage in mining. It was a
complete about-face in policy. The government retained the right to
permit the mining activity and superintend the mining enterprise. This
reservation later became a valuable asset to the mineral barons,
because government control inevitably brought with it government
subsidy.
Other salient features of the Mining Act included permission to
litigate rulings of the government granting or rejecting permission to
4 DEVELOPMENT OF MINING LAW IN JAPAN, by Toshimasa Sugimura, Assistant Pro-
fessor, Law Faculty, Kyoto University, translated by Mr. Chuzo Kondo.
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mine. The old law did not permit smelting or refining of certain metals
apart from mine ownership and operation, primarily to simplify
accounting and inspection of the output in finished metal, because all
went either into the national coffers to finance military activities or
into the munitions of war needed for the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95
or the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. However the new Mining Act
released the miner from the obligation to refine his own ores and gave
strong impetus to setting up of central smelters and refineries. This
opened direct markets for sale of mineral ores and greatly stimulated
mining development.
THE MINING INDUSTRY LAW OF 1905
The first complete mining code for Japan was the Mining Industry
Law (Law No. 45, March 1905) which supplanted previous enact-
ments. It contained eight chapters: (1) General Rules; (2) Mining
Rights; (3) Use of Land; (4) Mining Police; (5) Mine Workers;
(6) Mine Taxes; (7) Appeal; (8) Lawsuit, Decision, and Punish-
ment. The chapter on Mine Workers was particularly significant. At
the start of the Meiji era most of the coal mines employed prison
labor. Later, poor farmers were recruited for mining and the status of
mine labor approached that of forced labor, largely under feudal con-
ditions. These conditions became so notorious that even under feudal
vassalage the mine workers struck and rioted throughout Japan. Con-
cer over this problem led to inclusion of protective measures for
labor in the new law.
The period following the wars with the Chinese and the Russians
saw a consolidation of holdings; management grew in scale and in
capital invested, and a revision in the previous Mining Act even per-
mitted foreigners to participate through the formation of corporations
able to acquire mining rights. The same story was to repeat itself in
World War I, in which Japan took a relatively insignificant part as
far as fighting was concerned. With mineral raw material imports at
a relative standstill, deniand rose both for the domestic market and
from abroad. Prices skyrocketed. Again mines expanded their scale
of operations, new mines were exploited, and Japanese mining ex-
perienced an unprecedented prosperity. The relation between the mining
industry and the military was emphasized even more strongly with the
sudden collapse of mine product prices and markets following World
War I.
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Revisions of the Mining Industry Law were made in several of the
years intervening between its enactment in 1905, and 1935. These
changes included amendments for mining registration, mining police,
regulations for control of coal mine explosions (forerunner for the
Mine Safety Code of 1949), a mortgage law, and miner's aid regu-
lations.
The mining law existing prior to the revision of December, 1950,
then, was basically the law enacted in 1905, with a few changes, far
from fundamental, made subsequently. The period commencing about
1937 to the end of hostilities is another chapter in the history of
Japanese mining legislation.
MINING LEGISLATION FOR AGGESSION
The marshalling of the mineral industry of Japan to support the
aggressive designs of the imperialistic military clique is clearly re-
flected in the laws enacted from 1937 to 1943. The Imperial Fuel
Industry Company Law (Law No. 53, 1937) and the Gold Production
Law (Law No. 59, 1937) gave special attention to consolidating, con-
trolling, and subsidizing the development of the nation's petroleum
and gold resources. The Imperial Petroleum Company Law (Law No.
73, 1941) formed the 50 per cent government-owned company which
took over 95 per cent of the national production of petroleum. The
mobilization of most of the country's mineral resources, however,
started in earnest with the Act to Promote the Production of Impor-
tant Minerals (Law No. 35, March 1938), which later was strength-
ened and revised (Law No. 35, March 1941 and Law No. 34, March
1943). This law gave government sweeping powers of control over
mining operations. That the plan was not a temporary measure is
indicated in the ten-year duration provided. This law froze mineral
prospecting by suspending the termination of prospecting rights, fixed
at four years under the existing Mining Law. Those who had covered
likely mineral areas thereafter continued to hold them until the expira-
tion of the act in June, 1948.
The alignment of Japan's mineral resources for the Pacific War
was continued with the passage of the Imperial Mining Development
Company Ltd. Law (Law No. 82, April, 1939) which consolidated
small and medium marginal mining operations under a single corporate
management, with fifty-fifty government and private ownership, and
profits guaranteed to the private shareholders.
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The Distribution of Coal and Coke Law (Law No. 104, April,
1940) was another mechanism for subsidizing the coal industry
through a 50 per cent government-owned corporation, the Japan Coal
Co., which exclusively bought coal output, financed the mines, and
distributed the coal to consumers.5
The Major Industries Organization Ordinance of September 1,
1941, was the last important preparatory step prior to the culmination
of events in Pearl Harbor in December. This ordinance granted broad
powers of control over production and price-fixing to the industrial
control associations, which in the case of minerals included the Coal
Control Association and the Mining Control Association. The Muni-
tions Company Law of October 28, 1943, pinpointed government
control down to the individual company and mine, smelter, or re-
finery.' To buttress her international credit and encourage prospecting
and mining of strategic minerals, Japan issued the Mining Encourage-
ment Ordinance No. 18 (Ministry of Commerce and Industry, April 1,
1943), which provided authority for subsidizing mine operators in such
prospecting, construction of mills and smelters, and purchase and
installation of mining equipment.
The regimenting of Japan's Home Island mineral production for
the war effort, however, was not enough. Obviously the effort would
be extended to other parts of the Empire and, as soon as the armies
took over, to occupied territories. The expansion into overseas terri-
tories started very early; many mining men who were repatriated to
Japan during the Occupation had worked in mines and smelters in
Manchuria, China, and southeastern Asiatic countries for ten years
or more. The large mining companies, too, had their investments in
these countries and sent some of their best engineers and other tech-
nicians to exploit the mineral raw materials for export to Japan's
largest processing capacity smelters and refineries.7
5 Solomon, Economdc Controls it the Japanese Coal Industry: Natural Resources
Section Report No. 52, Tokyo, August, 1946.6 Solomon, Wartime Administration of the Japanese Mineral Industry: Natural
Resources Section Report No. 17, Tokyo, January, 1946.
7 Subsidiaries and affiliates of some of the major mining companies abroad: (a)
Mitsubishi Mining Co.: Shin-Tai Coal Mining Partnership, Shang-Tung Gold Mine
Development Partnership, Ta-Wen-Kou Colliery Ltd., Hwai-Nam Colliery Ltd., Sho-
toku Mining Co. Ltd., Korean Anthracite Colliery Co.; (b) Nippon Mining Co.:
Chosen Flourspar Co. Ltd., Nichinan Iron Ore Co. Ltd., South Japan Mining Co. Ltd.
(southerly islands), Nippi Mining Ltd. (Philippines), Pacific Mining Co. Ltd., Oceanic
Phosphate Rock Co. Ltd., Ocean Mining Co. Ltd.; (c) Mitsui Mining Co.: Kawakami
Colliery (Karafuto), Naikawa Colliery (Karafuto), West Sakutan Colliery (Kara-
futo), Chio Colliery (Karafuto), Sansei Mining Co. (Korea), Kiilung Coal Mining
Ltd. (Formosa), Toa Mining Co. Ltd. (Manchuria), Sampo Mining Co. Ltd. (Man-
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Even the rabid militaristic group in the Cabinet Planning Board
realized the limitations of the Home Islands in minerals necessary to
the war munitions industries, although high quotas fixed for produc-
tion of indigenous minerals during the war sometimes resulted in
dangerous and wasteful mining methods being used. But when, in the
fall of 1943, severe shipping losses curtailed the supply of minerals and
ores from the colonies and occupied territories, a production crisis
occurred. The country's native resources were then taxed to the limit.'
Japan itself at that time was, and still is, poor in resources of such
essential minerals as iron, manganese, tin, and lead, and she has
barely enough copper to meet civilian requirements. Metallurgical
grade coking coal needed for manufacture of iron and steel also is
lacking, although advances have been made in processing techniques
under guidance of American scientists in GHQ, SCAP, utilizing a blend
of domestic and imported coking coal. Japan has no phosphate rock
for her fertilizer, and she imports about 90 per cent of her petroleum
requirements and all of her bauxite for alumina.
The point of all this is that Japan's Home Island paucity of mineral
resources, due to lack of adequate known reserves, poses a threat to
future peace unless through development of additional reserves she
can become self-sustaining at least to the extent of her normal civilian
requirements. If, by some miracle, Japan could again attain the peak
output which she reached in the period 1940-44 in most of her
minerals, with some help from outside she can support an industrial
economy. But she cannot even begin to accomplish this without search-
ing for and finding additional reserves, and developing them. This
brings us to a review of some of the more pressing problems encoun-
tered in a proposed revision of the Mining Law of Japan.
PROBLEMS OF R viSiON
The mining business is in some ways unique. A merchant must
move his commodities, even at a loss, to stay in business. A mine
churia), Tempozan Mining Co. Ltd. (Manchuria), Fukushima Mining Co. Ltd. (Palau
Group), Mitsui Light Metal Mining Co. (Korea), Wainan Coal Mining Co. (China),
Chuko Coal Mining Co. (China); (d) Onoda Cement Co.: Chosen Onoda Cement Co.
Ltd. (Korea), Kantosha Onoda Cement Co. Ltd. (Dairen, Kwantung), Manshu Onoda
Cement Co. Ltd. (Manchuria), Shanghai Cement Managing Corp. (China), Cebu
Portland Cement Co. Ltd. (Philippines); (e) Nitetsu Mining Co.: Mitsuzan Coal
Mine Co. Ltd. (Manchuria), Bado Mining Co. Ltd. (Korea, limestone), Kitashina
Mining Ltd. (North China, iron ore, coal, limestone) ; (f) Showa Mining Co.: Chosen
Showa Mining Co. Ltd., Chrome Mining Co. Ltd., Sobol Mine (Philippines, copper),
Karafuto Coal Mining Co. Ltd.
8 Natural Resources Section Report No. 17, op. cit.
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operator has a limited stock of goods, so to speak-his reserves-and
often can be ahead by conserving them in place. As already indicated,
the mining industry in Japan in the past has been largely under the
control of a very few family companies-the Mitsui, Mitsubishi,
Sumitomo, Furukawa, Nippon, and a few smaller companies. One
method of effecting a virtual monopoly of mining is to blanket pros-
pecting and mining claims over potential mineralized areas. An ex-
ample: The Mitsubishi Company in November, 1947 held eighty-eight
coal and 197 metal and nonmetallic mining lots, comprising . total
of 181,875,960 tsubo (1,210 tsubo per acre), and 454 coal and
318 metal and nonmetallic prospecting permits covering a total of
545,180,711 tsubo.9
A survey made by the Mining Bureau, Ministry of Commerce and
Industry, early in 1949, showed that as of December 31, 1948, out
of 44,503 approved prospecting rights for mineral deposits, only
2,017 or 4.5 per cent were reported as actively being prospected; of
a total of 6,030 mining concessions (based on discovery of minerals
in commercial quantity) only 2,108 or 34.9 per cent were being worked.
Subsequent surveys made by the writer confirmed this pattern right
up to December 1950. The expiration of the-Act to Promote the Pro-
duction of Important Minerals in June, 1948, reinstating again the
four-year limitation on prospecting permits under the old Mining Law,
did not alter the situation. It merely caused a reshuffling of claims
during 1949, but the notorious inactivity still continued. In addition,
investigation showed that in several of the major mining districts 70
to 80 per cent of prospecting permits were in the hands of brokers
and speculators.
Another problem that confronted the Revision Committee was
absence of any legislation protecting the mining of several nonmetallic
minerals important to the economy: dolomite, pyrophyllite, feldspar,
silica sand, limestone, talc, and fire clay. Producers were generally at
the mercy of landowners and in many instances had to purchase out-
right the land on which their deposit was located; if this was impracti-
cal, a rental, varying from time to time, had to be paid by the operator.
In such cases, tenure was not certain, the operator could not follow his
deposit with any assurance into adjoining lands, and investment in
costly equipment and machinery necessary for large-scale mining or
quarrying was almost out of the question. The importance of these
9 Source: Company statement.
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minerals to the iron and steel, cement, fertilizer, and chinaware indus-
tries justified their recognition under the Mining Law, with the same
privileges accorded other minerals in the allocation of transport,
materials, and subsidies in times of emergency and shortage, as well
as permanence of tenure of lands chiefly valuable for these minerals.
Japan's limited area of cultivable land (about 15 per cent of total
land area) posed another serious problem-a conflict between agri-
cultural and mining interests. Under the old law, mining prospectors
and operators damaged surface rights largely with impunity against
being made to pay just compensation. Farmers complained bitterly,
especially in the important coal producing area of Fukuoka Prefecture.
Coal mining caused subsidence of many rice paddy lands to a point
below sea level, causing partial or total loss as farm land owing to the
lack of drainage. Total damage as of 1950 was estimated by Ministry
of Agriculture and Forestry officials at 22.5 billion yen.
The sweeping powers granted to the government agencies dealing
with mining by the Act to Promote the Production of Important Min-
erals, the rigid controls exercised by the control associations under
authority of the Major Industries Organization Ordinance, the law
creating the Japan Coal Company as a monopoly for the purchase
and distribution of coal, and the Munitions Company Law,1" had set
the pattern of normal procedure for such agencies. Even during the
Occupation the Mining Bureau, despite the repeal of these wartime
measures, continued administrative procedures which set up priorities
based on vague, arbitrary standards of "urgent need of the economy"
and "importance to the national rehabilitation." The return to a peace-
time economy demanded the release of the industry from stringent
bureaucratic control which was also authorized by many provisions
of the existing Mining Law. Nor did the old law call for "due process,"
in the American sense, which implies a hearing, decision, and right of
appeal, either in passing on the rights of mining claimants or in the
taking of lands for mining purposes. The new Constitution of Japan
(Article 29) guaranteed these rights in property.
BASIC CHANGES IN TE LAw
While many differences appear between the Revised Mining Code
and the old Mining Law, the basic changes only will be discussed. In
view of the strong conflict of interest between agriculture and mining,
10 Citation for these laws under the section, "Mining Legislation for Aggression."
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after much debate the idea of a high-level board with authbrity for
adjudicating the question of land use was adopted. A board within the
Ministry of Commerce and Industry, as originally suggested, was
rejected, and a companion law prepared and passed coincidentally
with the revised Mining Law (Land Coordination Establishment Law,
Law No. 292, 1950) was the final acceptable solution. Article 15 of
the new Mining Law assumes the authority of the Land Coordination
Commission to designate lands not proper for mining as compared
to public interest or the interests of agriculture, forestry or other indus-
tries, and in such instances prevents allowance of a mining right.
Article 187 of the new Mining Law permits an appeal from action by
the Chief of the Bureau of International Trade and Industry (formerly
Bureau of Commerce and Industry) rejecting an application for a
mining right, approving a mining lease, or disposing of an application
for decrease of a mining area, or from action by the Bureau Chief
or under the Land Expropriation Law (Law No. 29, 1900, now under
revision) on application for use or expropriation of land for mining
purposes.
The Land Coordination Commission Establishment Law sets up a
commission of five, appointed by the Prime Minister, and makes the
commission independent of the ministries so as to avoid conflicting
interests between the two pertinent ministries affected. Thus the
machinery has been established for placing the land use and expropria-
tion on a basis of national good, rather than the interests of one or the
other of several economic groups.11
A second major change in the Mining Law involves the reduction
of the prospecting period from four to two years. Renewals are pos-
sible twice for most minerals, three times for petroleum prospecting
permits. This provision was necessary to meet the demand of mining
operators who have developed a spirited interest in geologic explora-
tion as a result of technical guidance furnished by geologists on duty
with Natural Resources Section, and who find four years inadequate
in view of the shutting down of exploration activities in winter in most
mountainous areas of Japan. In petroleum exploration, where modern,
large-scale, and costly methods are used, the total period may extend
to eight years, while other mineral exploration may extend for a period
of six years. However, Article 19 denies the renewal in the first instance
"1 The chairman of the newly appointed Commission is Professor SaIae Waga-
tsuma, Faculty of Jurisprudence, Tokyo University, who was a member of the National
Mining Law Revision Committee.
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"unless it is evident that the applicant has conscientiously prospected
and the necessity of continued digging is recognized for ascertaining
the conditions of the mineral deposit." This contingency, if properly
and firmly administered, is intended to eliminate the holding of such
claims in a dormant state and the blanketing of lands by large mining
companies merely as "protection." The opportunity is thus furnished
legitimate mining operators to take up claims on lands previously kept
idle. Of course, any law has loopholes, and this one is no exception,
but the spirit and the intent of the law to require diligent prosecution
of the prospect to a discovery are clear. A great deal will depend on
the enforcement of this provision.
At this point, the importance of efficient and prompt administration
should be mentioned. A survey of procedures in the district mining
offices by the writer as late as March, 1951, revealed that the backlog
of prospecting and mining claims pending was such that it required
from two to three years on the average to process a claim. Inadequate
budget for personnel and travel was indicated as the chief reason.
Obviously, however, no matter how fair and effective a mining law is
enacted, failure to administer it in accordance with the spirit and intent
will defeat the legislative purpose. There is room for much improve-
ment in this respect, and the Japanese government agencies concerned
are now seriously studying the problem, with a view to expediting
all claims on the basis of revised regulations.
A third basic change in the law added the minerals not previously
covered. Here again the protection given to these minerals will be
purely theoretical unless the backlog of pending claims is disposed of
so that the newly filed claims for prospecting or mining of the added
minerals may be acted upon promptly.
The acceptance of "due process" is found as a pattern throughout
the revised Mining Law. Article 40, for example, provides that:
The Chief of Bureau of International Trade and Industry, when he
intends to give an order under the provisions of Article 37, paragraph 1,
Article 38, paragraph 1, or the preceding Article paragraph 1, shall hold a
public hearing, requesting beforehand the presence of the mining applicant
concerned.
2. The Chief of Bureau of International Trade and Industry shall,
when he intends to hold the hearing under the preceding paragraph, notify
the mining applicant concerned the purport of the case and the date and the
place of the hearing, and make public the same not later than 1 week prior
to the date.
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In the hearing, the mining applicant and the persons interested shall be
given an opportunity to present evidence and opinions concerning the case.
Other provisions cover notice of decision and right of appeal to the
Minister, the courts, or the Land Coordination Commission.
Two or three of the recommendations of American mining lawyers
did not receive a warm reception from the Japanese. Their exclusion
from the final draft indicates the attitude of SCAP personnel giving
assistance and guidance, and the objective: that this revision should
be the free and voluntary act of the Japanese lawmakers themselves.
Article 5 of the old law provided that: "No person other than sub-
jects of Empire or juridical person duly formed in accordance with the
laws thereof, are entitled to secure mining rights." At a time when the
Japanese government was calling for foreign investment, those drafting
the revised law felt that a provision giving foreigners reciprocal rights
in mining would encourage such investment. However, the Foreign
Ministry insisted that the giving of reciprocal rights should be included
in future treaties rather than become a part of the fundamental mining
law. Article 17 of the proposed draft covering the subject merely stated
that "no one other than the Japanese people or the Japanese juridical
person shall become a mining right owner" and seemed to lay down
a policy of exclusion which might prevent future separate agreement
between Japan and other countries. It was finally agreed that this
Article should be amended to add condition, "provided that, this shall
not apply when otherwise provided in a treaty."
American lawyers suggested a general definition of minerals coming
under the law as being those of economic value, with some means set
up for determining the classification of the land as more valuable for
mineral than, for example, for agricultural purposes. The old mining
law specified by name the minerals to be included, and the Japanese
lawmakers felt that this system could not be disturbed without serious
hazard to the mining system in general. The creation of a high-level
Commission to decide the question of the value of the land for mining
or other purposes was a compromise suggested and readily accepted
by the Japanese.
A third important suggestion by American lawyers in the framing
of a revision was the reduction of the prospecting period from four to
two years, with provision for only one renewal. This was coupled
with a requirement that the applicant for such a permit set forth facts
indicating that he was a bona fide mining operator or had the means
and ability to actually do prospecting work. The Japanese drafting the
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revision considered this provision too drastic. First, the four-year
period was considered too short in view of the mountainous character
of much of the country which was snowed in during winters. As to the
requirement for the prospector to show evidence of good faith in
advance, the Japanese felt that the authority of the Bureau Chief to
later control his operations would be ample protection against fraudu-
lent filings. Article 63 of the revised law requires the prospecting right
holder to submit an operation plan and any revisions to the Bureau
Chief; Article 69 also calls on him to report progress of his work; and
Article 193 (1) places a penalty on the prospector for failure to report
such progress to the Bureau Chief.
A rather unusual view of criminal and tort liability of the principal
for the acts of an employee appeared in an early draft. Several penalty
provisions are included in the old as well as the revised Mining Law.
Following these it. was proposed that "When a representative of a
juridical person or a proxy, an employee or any other worker of a
juridical person or natural person has committed the violation of the
provisions of the preceding three articles in connection with the busi-
ness of the juridical person or the natural person, the juridical person
or the natural person shall be punished with a fine under the respective
Articles, in addition to that the offender shall be punished."
Although the Japanese framers contended that the Civil Code would
limit liability to only such cases where the acts done by the employee
were authorized and came within the scope of employment of the em-
ployee or other worker, sufficient doubts were raised by the American
lawyers to satisfy the Japanese that an additional clause should be
included as follows: "provided that this shall not apply to the cases
where there are proof that sufficient caution and supervision over the
representatives, employees and other workers of the juridical person
or individual have been exercised to prevent such acts of violation in
the business." (Article 194.)
The revised Mining Law is by no means a perfect document. It
represents the effort of both Japanese and Americans to accept mining
conditions in Japan as they are and have existed for many years, but
to meet new concepts which are gradually developing, and to shape
the law to meet new needs. For instance, Japan is a well-mineralized
country, but in the matter of exploration she is far behind most other
countries of the world both in the acceptance of the basic importance
of this phase of mining activity and in the techniques of successful
exploration.
FAR EASTERN SECTION
As pointed out by staff geologists of SCAP:
Failure to employ modem geological methods in the search for ore, as well
as the lack of good geologic maps, has hampered the mineral exploration
program. In addition, geologic training in Japanese universities is not well
adapted to the practical requirements of the mineral industries. Basic field
experience is lacking among many geologists, who are inclined to pursue
academic research without regard for the pressing need to find new ore
to support Japan's recovering economy.1"
This points up the importance of exploration in Japan's future.
OUTLOOK
As previously indicated, Japan in the past depended on mineral raw
materials outside the borders to which she is now restricted under the
Potsdam Declaration. However, she is still eyeing these sources with
considerable interest. When a treaty is signed, it goes almost without
saying that her mining companies will endeavor again to mine and
utilize critically needed minerals in Southeast Asia and in Japan's
former colonies and occupied territories. This time, however, it will
be on the invitation of those countries, many of them anxious to have
the technological assistance of Japanese scientists and engineers, and
probably in the form of technological assistance contracts. Japanese
companies would agree to furnish technicians to explore and mine the
minerals of the underdeveloped countries, and would process the con-
centrates either there or in Japan. Thereafter Japan could furnish the
finished products to these countries in the form of iron and steel, and
machinery and equipment, which they require for development of their
own industrial economies.
The advantages of such mutual arrangements, however, will tend
to distract the Japanese from the basic need for exploration of their
own mineral resources. Aside from this, such procedure will be looked
upon with suspicion by those nations which suffered from Japan's
aggressive designs in the past. Nor will concentration on outside
sources of mineral raw materials to the exclusion of domestic mineral
deposits help in making Japan self-sufficient.
A sensible course for Japan, in order to increase the meager mineral
reserves she now has, would be to take the utmost advantage of the
great strides she has made in the direction of utilizing the new concepts
and techniques which have been offered by Allied geologists and mining
12 Grant, Japanese Mining and Petroleum Ihtd utrie: Programs under the Occupa-
tion, 112 ScmNcE 577-588 (November 17, 1950).
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engineers. In this task, the revised Mining Law, with its enhanced
protection of minerals of economic value, its greater opportunity to
individual citizens to explore and mine, its curbing of monopolistic
tendencies, its insistence on diligent prosecution of the search for
minerals by those filing prospecting permits, its constitutional protec-
tion to the individual against arbitrary bureaucratic action directed
either against the mining applicant or against the owner of the sur-
face-this new Mining Law, will prove a bulwark of the new Japan in
her struggle for survival in the highly competitive and industrialized
era in which we are now living. As so well put by the Nippon Times
in its comment on the promulgation of the New Mining Law (Decem-
ber 29, 1950): "The door is opened, and the future of the mining
industry has received a new modern lamp to light the way toward
increased production and, as an end result, toward a better standard
of life for the whole of the nation."
